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Abstract 
Within this paper we use the thought experiment of a signaling game to demonstrate 
how information can be seen to evolve as a complex, systemic accomplishment amongst 
a community of actors. An example from animal communication studies is first used to 
highlight the relevance of this thought experiment. We then unpack various ideas about 
the nature of information in terms of aspects of the signaling game. We also 
demonstrate the way in which this thought experiment helps clarify the relationship 
between information and that of agency, embodiment, intentionality and materiality. 
This leads us to demonstrate the application of the concept of a signaling game to a 
class of information system ubiquitous in the human sphere: that of an effective manual 
system. 
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Introduction 
Within the current paper we wish to propose a novel ‘method’ of research (at least as far as Information 
Systems is concerned) – that of the thought experiment (Cohen 2005). Thought experiments are of course 
considered a valid form of doing and presenting ‘research’ in disciplines such as philosophy. But such 
abstract ‘experiments’ are also well-utilized in the natural sciences, in areas such as theoretical physics 
and theoretical biology. For instance, Einstein formulated many of his theoretical insights by conducting 
thought experiments of various kinds. One famous experiment involved him thinking about what would 
happen if someone was travelling in an elevator accelerating toward the speed of light. This enabled 
Einstein to formulate some classic features of his theory of relativity. In contrast, Axelrod (2006) has used 
the thought experiment of a prisoner’s dilemma game to argue for the evolution of cooperation as an 
effective survival strategy amongst species. 
We want to use this paper to demonstrate some of the power of the thought experiment for the discipline 
of information systems. We want to use a particular thought experiment adapted from the philosophy of 
convention (Lewis 2002) and the philosophy of information (Skyrm, 2010) and use it to better explain 
how information is not ‘stuff’ but a complex accomplishment of a community of actors. Information is 
also not an accomplishment just available to the human species. It has evolved as a selective strategy 
within both simple and complex organisms (Dennett 1996) and is related to the need to achieve 
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coordinated behavior by organisms in the face of a turbulent environment (Maturana and Varela 1987). 
Information in this sense can be seen as an evolutionary phenomenon critical to the ‘survival’ of a 
particular community of actors. More precisely, information is very much related to the accomplishment 
of shared intentionality (Tomasello and Carpenter 2007), which has evolved because of the ‘payoffs’ this 
accomplishment provides to social organisms, such as ourselves. 
Thought experiments such as Maxwell’s Demon and Schrödinger’s cat have been used within disciplines 
such as theoretical physics to explore the relationship of a particular conception of ‘information’ to issues 
such as entropy and quantum indeterminancy. However, the particular way of methodically unpacking 
the concept of information used here and as it relates to issues of organization is new to information 
systems. The thought experiment considered here is not just useful for unravelling where information 
comes from and what its nature involves. In doing so, the thought experiment helps better illuminate a 
number of issues that are much-discussed in the information systems literature, but frequently not in a 
very clear manner. For instance, our thought experiment offers a useful way of unpacking the relationship 
of information to that of agency (Rose, Jones and True, 2005), embodiment (Mingers 2001), 
intentionality (Searle 1983) and materiality (Leonardi and Barley 2008). 
We build our thought experiment using the idea of a sender-receiver game (sometimes referred to as a 
signaling game), first formulated by Lewis in his book on the nature of convention (Lewis 2002). This idea 
is taken up by Skyrms (Skyrms 2010) in his book on the philosophy of language. We then discuss a case 
from the area of zoosemiotics (Sebeok 1972) that can be explained in terms of this particular thought 
experiment. This leads us to unpack the core elements from the experiment that are needed to frame 
some of the universals of information. 
Our argument then builds by considering how a particular type of information system, found in the 
human sphere, can be made sense of in terms of the idea of a signaling game – this is the class of 
information systems that Lederman and Johnston (2011) refer to as effective manual systems. Such ways 
of organizing are particularly interesting because they eschew the use of digital computing and 
communications technology. Instead, they involve the articulation of material and highly visual artefacts 
such as manual whiteboards, magnetic tokens, post-it notes, cards and strips of paper. Such manual 
systems are effective and viable within contemporary settings because the very materiality and highly 
visual nature of the artefacts used within these ways of organizing offer certain affordances (Gibson 1977, 
1979) to actors which are not easily reproduced within current digital technologies. 
We set up a scenario in which both students and practitioners of Information Systems are required to 
‘design’ an effective manual system for a simple organizational situation. We then unpack this scenario as 
a signaling game, and in doing so, make better sense of what an information system constitutes, but also 
what the proper design of such systems should constitute. We conclude with a look at what our thought 
experiment of the signaling game contributes to understanding issues of agency, embodiment, 
intentionality and materiality, at least as these phenomena are seen as problematic within the discipline 
of Information Systems. 
Thought experiments 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy considers thought experiments to be ‘devices of the imagination 
used to investigate the nature of things’. A thought experiment (gedankenexperiment) begins usually by 
portraying the features of some theoretical situation. It then ‘experiments’ with this situation, typically by 
thinking through its’ consequences. Therefore, thought experiments normally apply subjunctive reasoning 
– ‘what might happen if X…’ or ‘what are the natural consequences of X?’ 
Thought experiments are much used in theoretical physics. For instance, the thought experiment typically 
referred to as Schrödinger’s cat was famously used to explore the consequences of quantum 
indeterminancy. Similarly, Maxwell’s demon was used to explore certain consequences of the second-law 
of thermodynamics. Finally, Einstein’s elevator, as we have mentioned, was successfully used to expand 
upon the notion of relativity. However, thought experiments have a long and established history within 
philosophy, dating back to Socrates and Plato (Cohen 2005). Some have argued that philosophy would 
not be philosophy without the thought experiment (Dennett 2014). Thought experiments are also 
conducted frequently in professional disciplines such as law, where they are typically referred to as 
hypothetical cases. 
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Thought experiments can be broadly categorized as either destructive or constructive. Destructive thought 
experiments are critical in the sense that they are built to demonstrate the fallacy of some theory, 
situation or position. In contrast, constructive thought experiments are apologetic in the sense that they 
are constructed to demonstrate the truth of a particular theory, situation or position. 
Some thought experiments are analyzable as logical arguments, often in the form of reductio ad 
absurdum. But many famous thought experiments are less rigorous and reliant on a background of 
intuitive reasoning. For this reason, Dennett calls this type of thought experiment an ‘intuition pump’ 
(Dennett 2014). Intuition pumps are thought experiments which rely upon the thinker’s intuition to 
develop an answer to a specified problem. If a thought experiment is sufficiently rich then various ‘knobs’ 
can be ‘turned’ within the experiment to see if our intuition holds. Dennett feels that such intuition pumps 
are a critical tool within philosophy, but he cautions in their use. In a positive sense, the intuition upon 
which such experiments rely is important for reasoning about complex subjects effectively. But such 
intuition can equally lead the thinker astray. 
We shall build primarily a destructive thought experiment in this paper but use it as a positive intuition 
pump. In particular, we shall set the thought experiment in terms of a simple game known as a signaling 
game (Lewis 2002; Skyrms 2010). We shall then turn various ‘knobs’ on this intuition pump to 
demonstrate that generally held conceptions of the concept of information, which are still very much used 
within disciplines such as information systems, are fallacious. As we shall see, this particular meta-
theoretical ‘game’ is particularly interesting because it can not only be used for our purposes to build a 
destructive thought experiment. It can also be used as a constructive thought experiment. We shall 
demonstrate that we can use the signaling game to highlight, through the application of certain intuition 
applied to this ‘game’, not only what information is not; we can use it to point at what information and the 
consequent concept of an information system must logically constitute. 
Signaling games 
Within this section we consider a thought experiment which shows how what we think of as information 
arises not through conscious ‘design’ but through spontaneous patterns of inter-action performed by a 
community of actors in relation to states of a particular environment (world). 
Consider the minimal case of a sender-receiver game in which we have two actors (O1 and O2), two states 
of the world (S1 and S2) and two acts that can be taken in response to these states (A1 and A2). One actor 
(O1) observes the state of the world and decides to send one of two possible messages (M1 or M2) to the 
other actor (O2) who is the receiver of the message. The receiving actor (O2) cannot directly observe the 
state of the world sensed by actor O1 but can choose to perform one of two acts (A1 or A2) in response to 
the message it receives. 
The actor O2 having acted, both O1 and O2 receive some ‘payoff’. Consider the simple situation where there 
is exactly one ‘correct’ act for each state of the world. Both actors receive a positive payoff if the correct 
action is chosen following transmission and receipt of some message – otherwise they receive a negative 
payoff. 
Figure 1 visualizes the major elements of this thought experiment. Actors (O1 and O2) are represented as 
cyclical entities. By this we are attempting to signify that an actor is a self-organizing system (Maturana 
and Varela 1987) – it is continually reproducing its internal environment in continuous interaction with 
some external environment. Let us simplify and assume that this internal environment is particularly 
concerned with implementing what Dennett (1996) refers to as decision strategies – making choices 
between alternative courses of action. Actors are also embodied (Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 
1993)(Mingers, 2001) meaning that an actors’ agency involves interaction with its external environment, 
and that such interaction relies upon two critical forms of apparatus making up the ‘body’ of the actor: a 
sensory apparatus and an effector apparatus. A sensory apparatus is made up of a series of sensors which 
continually monitor differences in the state of the external environment. An effector apparatus consists of 
a series of effectors that allow the actor to perform instrumental action in relation to this external 
environment – to manipulate ‘structures’ within the external environment and through so doing to 
change the state of the external environment. 
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Figure 1. A simple signalling ‘game’ as a thought experiment 
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Hence, the sensory apparatus of actor O1 enables it to discriminate between state S1 and state S2 of the 
external environment. Some decision strategy implemented within its internal environment enables actor 
O1 to decide either to produce message M1 or message M2 using some effector within its effector 
apparatus. This message changes the state of the external environment monitored by actor O2. The 
message, or more precisely the signal, is picked up by a sensor within the sensory apparatus of actor O2. A 
decision strategy embedded within the internal environment of this actor enables it to choose either to 
effect action A1 or action A2. 
The entire range of patterns of order corresponding to this thought experiment is laid out as a sequence in 
figure 1. It can be expected in this ‘game’ that the actors will eventually settle upon some system of 
equilibrium where particular messages are always associated with particular states of the world and 
actions taken. This will occur because the association between particular messages and actions will be 
reinforced by positive payoff. In such cases the association amounts to the establishment of a convention 
(Lewis, 2002). For instance, a convention might become established in this manner between the state of 
the world S1, the message M2 and the action A1. In other words, whenever one actor observes S1 it emits 
M2 and all receiving actors of this message effect action A1. 
An example of a signaling game from zoosemiotics 
The thought experiment of the sender-receiver game described in the previous section has been proposed 
as a useful meta-model for theorizing about the evolution of sign-systems amongst many social animals, 
including humans. Consider the case of the prairie dog (Slobodchikoff, Perla and Verdolin 2009) which 
are formally classified as rodents within the squirrel family, Sciuridae. There are five species of prairie 
dog: black-tailed, Gunnison, white-tailed, Utah and Mexican. Gunnison prairie dogs are the most studied 
and live in the ‘four corners’ area of the South Western United States - a boundary area between the states 
of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico and Utah. Prairie dog colonies are made up of a number of distinct 
groups that defend territories. These groups, sometimes referred to as clans or coteries, occupy an area 
consisting of one or more burrow openings, an underground burrow system and the food resources 
growing within the territory. Territorial boundaries are defended by all members of the territorial group, 
which can vary in size from one individual to several males and females. 
As far as their sensory apparatus is concerned, prairie dogs have good sight and hearing. They have 
dichromatic color vision, meaning that they see well in the blue and yellow parts of the visual spectrum, 
but not well in the red range. They can also hear sounds in much the same auditory range as humans. 
Prairie dogs use a number of different parts of their effector and sensory apparatus to communicate. They 
communicate through sounds such as alarm calls, through visual signals such as wagging of their tails and 
standing upright in an alert posture; they also seem to communicate through the use of olfactory and odor 
cues given off by glands situated both in their anus and in their faces. 
Alarm calls are by far the most well studied forms of prairie dog communication, particularly amongst 
Gunnison prairie dogs (Slobodchikoff, Perla et al 2009). The alarm calls comprise loud and often 
repetitive vocalizations that sound similar to certain forms of bird call. Such calls are given by one or more 
prairie dogs within a colony when a predator is detected. A particular type of call produces a distinct 
escape response on the part of other prairie dogs on hearing the call. All five species of prairie dog 
produce such calls but the acoustic structure of these calls varies between species. 
In close studies of the behavior of Gunnison prairie dogs a number of clear patterns of order are evident, 
which may be expressed as a series of decision strategies. Observation suggests that they employ 
something like the following set of decision ‘rules’: IF predator-call is ‘human’ THEN run to burrow AND 
perform a colony dive (all animals within a colony dive into their burrows); IF predator-call is ‘hawk’ 
THEN run to burrow AND perform a limited dive (only those dogs within flight path dive into burrows); 
IF predator-call is ‘coyote’ THEN run to burrow AND stand at alert; IF predator-call is ‘dog’ THEN stand 
at alert at your current position. 
From the point of view of evolutionary biology, each of these decision strategies makes sense in terms of 
the likely intentions of the predator denoted by a particular call. Predatory humans with rifles frequently 
walk around the edges of prairie dog colonies and can shoot any prairie dog from several hundred meters 
away. An appropriate act to make in response to the presence of such a predator is for the entire colony to 
run to the nearest burrow and dive inside. In contrast, red-tailed hawks stoop with great speed to capture 
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prey. However, once committed to a dive they cannot capture prairie dogs outside of the immediate 
trajectory of their dive. Hence, an appropriate survival strategy is for the individuals within the flight path 
of the hawk to run to the nearest burrow and to dive in. 
It is noteworthy that the relationship between states of the world, messages and actions appears to be 
inherited in cases such as that of the warning calls of prairie dogs. Hence, a prairie dog can emit a call for 
‘hawk’ even when it has never previously seen a hawk. These signaling patterns have evolved amongst 
particular species as a survival strategy. 
The payoff of survival has served to select a particular system of equilibrium within this signaling game. 
Such inherited patterns are typically contrasted with that of arbitrary conventions of signaling familiar 
within the human sphere. Millikan (1984) argues that a pattern is only conventional if it is reproduced 
purely by weight of precedent and only if it is unlikely to emerge or re-emerge in the absence of such 
precedent. Conventional patterns are thus arbitrary patterns. Conventional patterns are patterns for 
which other patterns might well be substituted except for historical accident. 
Within signaling games conducted in the human sphere most, but not all, patterns are conventional in the 
sense outlined by Millikan. Signaling games amongst the species Homo Sapiens are mostly (but not 
always) a collective accomplishment reliant upon informative conventions. For instance, in a companion 
paper (Beynon-Davies, 2013) we have discussed a form of human signaling which appears to be non-
arbitrary – that of human emotive facial expression. But whether the pattern is reproduced by genetic or 
by cultural means does not change the essential features of signaling as a game. We examine some of the 
consequences of the signaling game for the idea of information in the next section. 
Turning some ‘knobs’ on the intuition pump of the signaling game 
One of the key contributions of the signaling game as a thought experiment is that it highlights the 
fragility of a number of conceptions of information adopted in various aspects of the information systems 
literature. Each of these conceptions can be considered a ‘knob’ that we can turn in relation to the 
intuition pump of the signaling game as described previously. In other words, we can ask questions such 
as ‘What happens if such a conception is taken literally...’ 
One particularly prevalent characterization of information is one in which information is seen as 
fundamental ‘stuff’ which helps any physical system maintain organization (Stonier, 1994). As such, 
information is faceted as an objective phenomenon, independent of the actor. Hence, the signals of the 
Gunnison prairie dog can be analyzed separately from actors and actions. They can be considered as 
distinctive, invariant patterns produced and re-produced by particular organisms – as data. 
This conception underlies the classic approach to information, evident in the theory of Shannon and 
Weaver (1949). Within ‘information theory’, information lies in the message, or more precisely in the 
signal which conveys the message. Information is associated with the degree of order (negentropy) 
evident in the signal. According to this perspective, as far as the signaling game is concerned, both M1 and 
M2 as signals ‘contain’ information. But consider the case in which M1 (a predator-call) is produced by a 
Gunnison prairie dog (A1) but sensed by a black-tailed prairie dog (A2). These two different species of 
prairie dog emit or effect similar but noticeably different signals in the presence of the same predator. But 
does it make sense in this situation to think of M1 emitted by A1 as still containing information for A2. 
Another particularly dominant perspective is to conceptualize information as the act of interpretation of 
data. In this sense, information is seen to be created within acts of sense-making by individual actors 
(Boland, 1987). In this guise it is faceted as a subjective phenomenon, bound to the actor. Here, 
information is bound with some notion of internal processing undertaken within the internal 
environment of particular organisms. In the case of prairie dogs example, for instance, in-formation is 
particularly associated with the decision strategy accomplished by particular prairie dogs in the face of 
predation. 
We as humans can hear most of the signal emitted by a particular prairie dog as a predator call. Hence, we 
may, with much practice, be able to train our ear to identify one predator-call from another. But does the 
development of such ability equate with being in-formed in terms of this particular signaling game? Even 
if we train our ear to be able to distinguish one predator-call from another we are unlikely to want to or be 
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able to take the action that a prairie dog would take. So are we truly in-formed by this act of 
interpretation? 
More recently, information has been considered an inter-subjective phenomenon; reliant on the 
‘negotiation’ of collective or shared intentionality (Searle 1983). As such, information is considered an 
inter-subjective accomplishment amongst groups or communities of actors. Here, information is related 
to the shared ways in which actors build an ‘aboutness’ between sensed aspects of the world and mental 
states. In our thought experiment, one aspect of such collective intentionality involves the aboutness 
between the state of the world S1 and some internal state which causes the actor to emit the message M2. 
In turn, message M2 becomes a state of the world which causes some mental state in all receiving actors, 
causing them to effect action A1. 
However, there is much debate about whether collective or shared intentionality is necessary for 
information to exist. Part of the reason we deliberately chose to describe an instance of a signaling game 
from animal communication studies was to emphasize that information may occur within situations in 
which the notion of shared intentionality may be questionable. Tomasello and Carpenter (2007) propose 
that shared intentionality is a defining difference between our species, Homo Sapiens, and the rest of the 
animal kingdom. ‘Shared intentionality ... Refers to collaborative interactions in which participants 
have a shared goal (shared commitment) and coordinated action roles for pursuing that shared goal’ 
(Tomasello and Carpenter 2007). The notion of shared intentionality is based upon a model of intentional 
action founded in the idea of a control system or process. Such a control process is composed of a goal to 
which the system is directed, the ability to act to change aspects of the environment and the ability to 
perceive the environment so as to know when the state of the environment matches the goal. But shared 
intentionality can only emerge at the level of what Dennett (1996) refers to as a Gregorian psyche: the 
level at which a complex inner environment present within some organism is able to ‘model’ the external 
environment sufficiently well for the actor to take intentional action. 
Finally, we should mention the most radical position which proposes that information does not exist – it 
is a null concept. Stimulated by the work of Maturana and Varela (1980) and their idea of an autopoietic 
(self-producing or self-organizing) system, this viewpoint maintains that information is merely a 
convenience imposed by observers upon situations of behavioral coordination through structural coupling 
(Beeson 2009). In this sense we observe patterns of order in some situation, such as the ones we have 
considered in our signaling game. But such patterns merely correspond to invariances between the 
actions of particular actors in relation to a particular environment. We impose upon such patterning the 
convenient idea of information being ‘conveyed’ or ‘communicated’ as a useful way of accounting for the 
behavioral coordination which corresponds to such invariances. 
This radically materialist account has been accused by some of tending to the extreme position that reality 
is merely an invention of observers. If we turn this particular ‘knob’ far enough then the role of both 
inherited patterns and conventional patterns of signaling are demoted merely to invariances evident 
within a particular environment of inter-acting organisms. The null account, as we shall see, also has 
some difficulty in dealing with the role played by external but persistent artefacts, created and used by 
organisms for signaling purposes, sometimes remote across time and space. 
Therefore, the key consequence we take from our thought experiment of the signaling game is that a true 
account of information must encompass all four viewpoints in one entangled whole. Information is 
objective because it relies upon materiality. Information is subjective because it is built from agency and 
embodiment. Information may be inter-subjective when it amounts to the outward expression of shared 
intentionality. Finally, in terms of each of these conceptions taken independently, information may not 
exist. Information is not a substantive concept solely reliant upon any component part of our thought 
experiment. Instead, it is perhaps better to propose information as being a phenomenon which emerges 
from the continuous exercise or accomplishment of some ‘signaling game’. 
An anthropo-signaling game 
We take the key structural elements of the thought experiment of the signaling game to be applicable not 
only to situations of ‘information’ behavior in the animal sphere but also to many examples of such 
behavior in the human sphere. Games such as Axelrod’s prisoner dilemma are used as meta-models or 
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abstractions in other disciplines to highlight key features present amongst diverse phenomena. It is in this 
sense that we juxtapose an example from the animal and the human world within this paper. 
Within aspects of pedagogy we have developed a simple instantiation of the signaling game to help 
business students and practicing managers and technologists to make better sense of the concept of 
information. We have also used this game as an intuition pump for participants to explore the concept of 
an information system itself, and to turn various ‘knobs’ on this intuition pump related to the proper 
‘design’ of such systems. 
Consider a simple game in which participants are first divided into groups of four. Each of these groups is 
then given the same task, namely, devising a way of coordinating the movement of units of ‘material’ 
through different ‘locations’ within some organizational ‘space’. Such ‘material’ might correspond to 
production containers in a manufacturing setting or patients in a healthcare setting or modules in an 
educational setting. The associated ‘locations’ might consist of production units, medical procedures or 
states of module delivery and assessment. Participants are then asked to simulate both the ‘material’ and 
organizational ‘space’ in some way. For instance, participants might assume that some convenient artefact 
such as a chair corresponds to a unit of ‘material’ and some area of the room in which the game is played 
corresponds to the organizational ‘space’. They are then told to divide this allocated space up into four 
smaller areas which should correspond to four ‘locations’. 
Each group of players is given a small physical whiteboard along with a set of colored magnetic tokens, 
consisting of 6 red tokens; 6 blue tokens; 6 green tokens; and 6 black tokens (as illustrated in figure 2). 
Each group is then given the task of designing a scheme for coordinating the work of multiple workers in 
placing and moving ‘material’ through different ‘locations’ using solely this artefact. They are told to 
assume that workers work within groups together in different time-periods (shift patterns) and that no 
verbal or written communication occurs between a group of workers working within one time-period and 
that of another. 
The players are further told that the whiteboard and magnetic tokens must be used to accomplish two 
things. First, inform a group of workers within a time-period how many units of ‘material’ there currently 
are at each ‘location’. They are told to assume that a maximum of six units of ‘material’ can be held at a 
given ‘location’ at one time. Second, inform a group of workers how many units of ‘material’ need to be 
moved from one ‘location’ to another nominated ‘location’ within a time-period. 
 
 
Figure 2. Elements of the anthropo-signaling game 
 
A key constraint is set for the game, namely that no words can be written on the whiteboard. A set of 
colored pens is available for use by each team but these pens can only be used to draw something, not 
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write something on the whiteboard. Once they have designed their scheme, participants are asked to test 
it. In other words, the groups playing the game are required to enact one or more scenarios in which two 
members of the group act as the group working in one time-period and two members act as the group 
working the next shift. They are particularly asked to use these scenarios to experiment with signaling 
both current ‘material’ positions and intended ‘material’ positions. Finally, each group is asked to explain 
their particular ‘design’ to the other groups playing the game. They are also asked to think about any 
similarities and differences between their solutions and whether certain ‘designs’ are better than others in 
terms of some criteria that they must arrive at themselves. 
One design ‘solution’ readily arrived at by most groups playing this game is to assume that the entire 
whiteboard represents the organizational ‘space’. Four squares are then drawn upon the whiteboard to 
represent the four ‘locations’ within the organizational ‘space’. Each square of organizational space is then 
color-coded. Hence, the first location might be thought of as the red location, the second the green 
location, the third the yellow location and the fourth the blue location. The number of magnetic tokens 
placed within each box upon the whiteboard can then be used to signal to workers the number of units of 
material currently at each location. A token which is non-standard for its area can be used to signal that 
an item should be moved to the area it color codes. Hence, the presence of a blue token in the green box 
should signal that one unit of material should be moved from the green location to the blue location. 
Now consider how this exercise in pedagogy works as a signaling game. The manipulation of a magnetic 
token by a particular actor causes changes to the physical environment. The articulation of a magnetic 
token amounts to a change of state to this physical environment of the work situation in question. This 
change of state is sensed by another actor and serves to signal a particular intent and content to this actor. 
On the basis of this message, the actor decides to act in a particular way, such as moving a particular chair 
from one location to another. 
The colored, magnetic tokens as well as the whiteboard clearly correspond to significant structures in the 
environment of the game. Four distinct acts of articulation can be undertaken in relation to these 
structures - placing a token of color X in a square of color X; removing a token of color X in a square of 
color X; placing a token of color X in a square of color Y; removing a token of color X in a square of color 
Y. 
The results from particular acts of articulation signal particular messages to participating actors. In other 
words, and as illustrated within figure 3, an actor A1 manipulates some physical structure S1, namely a 
colored, magnetic token using his/her effector apparatus. The concept of affordance (Norman 1999) refers 
to a property of a certain structure that allows an actor to perform an action. Two affordances of a colored 
magnetic token are exploited in the acts of articulation described. The first involves the selection of the 
token itself, particularly in terms of choice of color. The second involves the token’s positionability. A 
magnetic token can clearly be positioned in relation to other magnetic tokens anywhere upon the 
whiteboard. It can also be removed from a particular position upon the whiteboard. 
The configuration of tokens upon the whiteboard acts as a series of further affordances to actor A2. In 
particular, the articulation of structure S1 is sensed by the sensory apparatus of actor A2. The sensed 
physical state of structure S1 serves to signal some message M1 to actor A2. Two aspects of message M1 are 
indicated in figure 3. The first aspect specifies its intent (in this case a so-called directive) while the 
second aspect specifies its content (the location that a unit of ‘material’ (a chair) should be moved to). 
In other words, the physical state of S1 in relation to the whiteboard indicates not only what the structure 
refers to in terms of ‘material’ but what should be done in relation to this ‘material’. This means that the 
message M1 acts as a further affordance to the manipulation of some structure S2 within the work 
environment. Hence, in terms of content the structure S1 (a magnetic token) refers to a further structure 
S2 (a chair) within the work environment. However, the positioning of a particular colored token in 
relation to the colored squares of the whiteboard signals the intent of the message. A token of color X in a 
square of color X asserts that one unit of material is present at the specified location. The presence of a 
token of color X in a square of color Y directs actor A2 to move a unit of material from the location with 
color X to that of color Y. 
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Figure 3. Deconstructing the anthropo-signaling game 
 
Turning some further ‘knobs’ on the intuition pump 
The signaling game described in the previous section is not only meant to encourage reflection amongst 
participants about the nature of information; it is also meant to encourage reflective practice (Schön 
1983), particularly as such practice concerns the use and ‘design’ of informative artefacts within the 
workplace. The notion of ‘design’ in such terms is considered as a process of co-creating narratives of 
action in relation to particular ways of organizing (Gabriel and Connell 2010). It can also be seen as an 
attempt to catalyze ways of practical reasoning about the place of informative artefacts within particular 
situations of work (Statler 2014). 
The informative artefacts utilized within the game itself are deliberately simple, comprising a large, 
magnetic whiteboard and a range of colored, magnetic tokens. Such artefacts are familiar within the 
philosophy of so-called visual management, which is particularly implemented in terms of ideas of the 
visual workplace (Grief 1991) and notably through systems of visual devices situated within work settings 
to communicate with ‘doers’ – the actual people performing work within these settings (Grief 1991; 
Hirano 1995; Liff and Posey 2004). The success of visual management is often attributed to the tangibility 
and high visibility of such artefacts within group work (Galsworth 1997). 
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However, many of the features for reflection which arise from this game, we believe, are equally applicable 
to the ‘design’ and use of much more complex artefacts used for informative purposes within the 
workplace, namely digital computing and communications systems. Indeed, in many applications of this 
game we have used the artefacts of the whiteboard and the magnetic tokens as destructive thought 
experiments; as sensebreaking devices – as ways of breaking down conventional expectations of the place 
of informative artefacts and revealing the essential place of digital computing systems within particular 
ways of organizing. These features can be considered as six key ‘knobs’ that need turning in relation to this 
particular intuition pump. 
Information systems emerge in action 
In treating the way of organizing described in the previous section as a signalling game we can ask not 
only where is the information within this way of organizing (as we have done)? We can also ask where is 
the information system within this particular way of organizing work? The information system is clearly 
not in the ‘technology’. Indeed, our example deliberately does not involve any information technology, at 
least as conventionally conceived. The information system is also not in the work itself nor does it solely 
lie in aspects of communication, as we have portrayed it. This leads us to suggest that assigning the 
concept of an information system to the category of one or more of the substantive elements of a signaling 
game, which each contributes to some way of organizing, is to commit what Ryle (1949) refers to as a 
category mistake. 
A category mistake is an ontological error. It involves instantiating something as belonging to a particular 
category or class when this thing actually belongs to a different category or class. Within disciplines such 
as Information Systems, where the use of the term information system is of course commonplace, there 
appears to be a marked tendency to commit a similar category mistake. Much of the extant literature 
tends to equate an information system necessarily with the application of digital computing and 
communications technology. It is evident from a close analysis of signaling games that an information 
system actually instantiates a different category altogether, and in doing so is best conceived as a meta-
concept detached from any particular technologies but which emerges from some ‘signaling game’. 
Narrating the signaling game 
The natural consequence of thinking through the idea of an information system as a signaling game is that 
that informative artefacts can only be made sense of in terms of the holistic pattern of action making up 
the signaling game itself. This means that the ‘design’ of any informative artefact can only be made sense 
of (Weick 1995) in terms of some repetitive routine of action enacted not only by humans but also by 
structures within the wider environment such as ‘machines’ and data structures. As a consequence, to 
successfully reflect upon and ‘narrate’ any such ‘design’ organizational actors cannot focus purely upon 
the informative artefact itself as a structure, they must focus upon the performativity (D'adderio  2008) of 
the artefact – what the artefact does within the wider signaling game. 
Take an example relevant to digital computing and communication systems. Suppose a health service 
wishes to design an electronic patient record. Decisions as to what should go on such a record or what 
should be omitted from such a record can only be taken in terms of the action, or more likely actions, 
taken with this record. In other words, you cannot design an effective electronic patient record without 
knowing not only who is likely to use such a record and how, but for what communicative purposes and to 
initiate what coordinated action. 
Three patterns of action 
On close analysis it becomes evident that signaling games typically involve three patterns of action, which 
for lack of better terms we refer to as articulation, communication and coordination. Hence, to make 
sense of a particular informative artefact and narrate the ‘design’ of such an artefact to others we need to 
describe not only the ‘structure’ of such an artefact, we need to describe how the elements of such 
structure are articulated by significant actors for the domain in question. Narrators of our signaling game 
then frequently attempt to relate the particular articulations performed upon the artefact with particular 
coordinated work actions. But to do this successfully the narrators of any ‘design’ must deal with the ways 
in which particular articulations communicate to other actors and how such communication in turn 
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relates to particular instances of coordinated action. Therefore, a key consequence of the thought 
experiment of the signaling game is that information is not the same as or different from articulation, 
communication and coordination. Any proper rendering of information must encompass coupled acts of 
articulation, communication and coordination. 
Take the example of the electronic patient record again. A successful narration of the ‘design’ of such a 
record must first describe actions such as how the record is created and by whom. We then need to know 
something of the ‘life-history’ of the record – who reads the record; who updates the record and how; and 
finally, who, if anybody deletes the record and when. But the articulations in themselves are meaningless. 
To make sense of this artefact, we need to know in terms of each typical event within the ‘life-history’ of 
the electronic patient record what the event is meant to communicate. Communication is also not solely 
about content (reference and predication); it is also about intent (prescription). 
For example, an admissions clerk at a general hospital accesses a patient record typically to authenticate 
the person – to prove that the person is who they say they are. This is typically done by accessing an 
appropriate identifier for the person (reference) based upon certain details supplied by that person 
(predication). But in authenticating a person through access to a personal record certain rights are 
prescribed to this person in relation to the healthcare provision provided by this institution. Being unable 
to find a particular record on the registry clearly does not mean that the person does not exist. It merely 
means that the person searched for has not been declared as a patient of the healthcare service. Hence, 
the end-result of successful access is particularly important in terms of action. The likely result of the 
access of this record by this organizational actor is that this person will be admitted to the hospital, which 
will, of course, put in train a whole series of coordinated actions by various different hospital staff, which, 
in turn, are likely to cause further articulations of this particular artefact... 
The coupling of action 
The consequence of thinking of a signaling game as an entangled complex of three types of action is that 
to design any new signaling game we need to narrate the ways in which the three types of action inter-
relate or couple. The idea of coupling is taken from the work of Dourish (2004), where he defines it as ‘the 
degree of coordination of two elements, and how that coordination is maintained’. Coupling can be 
thought of as narrating the systems of equilibrium within some signaling game, either as is or envisaged. 
For instance, inherently in our account of the design of the electronic patient record given above we have 
started to narrate such coupling between domains of action. Hence, a given act of articulation (accessing a 
particular patient record) undertaken by a particular actor or role (admission clerk) is coupled to a given 
act of communication (asserts that this is a person entitled to healthcare at this institution), which is 
coupled in turn to a given act of coordination (admit this patient to the hospital). 
The performativity of artefacts 
The final consequence of the signaling game is that we must make sense of informative artefacts (such as 
whiteboards or electronic records) as key actors within such ‘games’. This is a key but difficult lesson, even 
for skilled ‘designers’ of ways of organizing with informative artefacts. The lesson is that ‘machines’, such 
as digital computing systems, and artefacts, like the magnetic whiteboard and its tokens, must be 
considered as having limited agency within any signaling game (Cooren 2004). This is not only because 
routine action within modern ways of work is never performed solely by human beings. It is because 
artefacts such as the whiteboard are essential actors within particular patterns because they help ensure 
coordinated action (Hutchins, 1995). 
In other words, an artefact such as a magnetic token placed upon some whiteboard is not only formed 
from certain material substance, it serves to inform actors and influence the performance of such actors. 
For instance, within the signaling game we have described, the whiteboard and the configuration of 
magnetic tokens deliberately stand in place of a lot of verbal communication between participating human 
actors. The place of the informative artefact as an actor can be demonstrated quite easily within this 
context. If we take the whiteboard and its’ tokens out of any of the designed patterns, then workers have 
to develop effective ways of verbally communicating assertions and directions across time-periods. As 
such, the artefact of the whiteboard must be considered a critical communicative actor in this context. 
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Information systems are not socio-technical systems 
As indicated above, much of the Information Systems literature, either explicitly or implicitly, adopts a 
view of information systems located upon the IT artefact (Benbasat and Zmud 2003). More recently, Lee 
et al have argued that this is limiting and that the proper artefact to consider in relation to our particular 
discipline is what they refer to as the information system artefact (Lee, Thomas and Baskerville 2015). For 
Lee et al the information system artefact can be unpacked into a separate ‘technology’ artefact, 
‘information’ artefact and ‘social’ artefact. This appears to echo some of the developing consensus 
surrounding the framing of an information system as a socio-technical artefact or more precisely a socio-
technical system. 
Adapting a socio-technical view means thinking of an information system as a substantive system made 
up of the inter-leaving of some system of information technology with some system of work. The 
suggested relevance of viewing information systems through a socio-technical lens has occurred 
repeatedly within the discipline of information systems, ever since the landmark paper of Bostrom and 
Heinen (1977). For instance, the work of Mumford (2006), which has influenced many research studies 
within IS, explicitly adopts a socio-technical viewpoint. The equally influential body of work by Checkland 
(1999) implicitly adopts an orienting distinction between soft (human) systems and hard (technical) 
systems. More recently, Alter’s (2003) call for the IS academy to focus on issues relating to IT-enabled 
work systems clearly employs a socio-technical lens. 
But our experience of inquiring into information systems through the thought experiment of a signaling 
game raises certain doubts about ways in which information systems are conceptualized as socio-technical 
‘artefacts’. We wish to argue that the conception of an information system as a substantive system 
consisting of the interaction of two sub-systems (a work system and a technology system) is particularly 
difficult to apply productively within situation of engagement with information systems in practice. This, 
we feel, is because a conception of an information system as a socio-technical system fails to adequately 
account for the emergent nature of information itself as an accomplishment. 
Conclusion 
Within this paper we have considered a simple thought experiment in which an information system is 
portrayed as a signaling game. We have used such a thought experiment in a destructive manner to turn 
the intuition pump in relation to some typical expressions of both the concept of information and the 
related concept of an information system evident within disciplinary usage. We have also used this game 
as a constructive thought experiment - as a way of highlighting some of the nature of what information 
and the associated concept of an information system must constitute. 
The original signaling game, as proposed by Lewis, has been applied by Skyrme to demonstrate how 
communicative conventions do not need to arise spontaneously, nor do they need in some way to be 
imposed by some external force. Such patterns of equilibrium typically evolve within an action-
environment and serve the key purpose of improving ‘survival’ chances of individual organisms situated 
within such an environment. We made something of a small intellectual leap in proposing that such 
patterns help resolve the problematic of information. The consequence of this is that information can be 
seen to evolve as a collective accomplishment amongst a community of actors. Treating information in 
this manner also helps us understand how information systems need not be formally designed and 
imposed upon a community of actors. In many situations the conventions underlying information systems 
evolve in the complex inter-action between actors and their environment. Therefore, a close analysis of 
various signaling games as instantiated in examples of both animal and human behavior highlights the 
multi-faceted nature of information within such systems. We conclude with six central lessons we take 
from our particular thought experiment. 
The thought experiment is not just useful as a way of thinking about how information behavior evolves, it 
is also useful for thinking about the nature of information itself. The traditional model of information 
behavior would describe the event of a prairie dog making a bark and another prairie dog making an 
appropriate flight response as an example of effective information transfer from one prairie dog to 
another (Shannon 1949). But where is the information and how is it transferred between two actors in this 
situation? Maturana and Varela (1987) argue that nothing is actually transferred between such actors – 
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there is merely a structural coupling between an actor and its environment. Perturbations in the 
environment may stimulate changes in the internal environment of a particular actor, which in turn cause 
it to make changes to its external environment. These changes to the external environment may form 
perturbations for other actors, and so on… 
Information must necessarily be related to materiality (Barad 2007). It is not only related to the idea of 
material bodies (embodiment) it is related to the idea of such bodies causing perturbations in the physical 
environment which in turn are used to constitute signals. Such signals are necessarily some pattern of 
differences (Bateson 1972) encoded in physical stuff. Take the example of the prairie dog signaling the 
presence of a predator to other prairie dogs. The signal consists of a pattern of sound waves (vibrations in 
the stuff of air) using two dominant frequencies and divided into short segments of about one tenth of a 
second in duration. In contrast, a magnetic token is built from more persistent stuff, in which differences 
present between tokens (such as color) serve to signal appropriate response on the part of human actors. 
Information is clearly and closely related to the notion of agency (Rose, Jones et al 2005). Agency is 
typically described as the ability to perform actions that have outcomes. Agency is imbued to agents or 
actors – some entities that can produce an effect or a change in terms of some environment. But 
information is normally associated with mutual rather than individual agency. Information is an 
accomplishment between two or more actors typically directed at what Lewis refers to as coordination 
problems. A coordination problem arises when people have a purpose or goal in common which must be 
achieved by joint action. In other words, achieving the goal cannot be achieved by the action of a single 
individual. Instead, two or more actors must coordinate their actions to achieve the goal. In such 
situations the effects produced within the environment by the acts of one actor are directed at influencing 
the actions of another situated actor. 
But agency is not limited to humans or other animals. Clearly much action within contemporary 
institutions is not enacted by humans but by ‘machines’ and other artefacts such as data structures. This 
means that the concept of agency is particularly problematic for any discipline such as information 
systems which attempts to deal with the relationship between technology and institution. In social 
determinist accounts only humans have agency. In technological determinist accounts technology has 
agency in the sense that technology influences institutional activity. 
Cooren (2004) and others attempt to develop a middle ground where technology, such as the tangible 
artefacts discussed in our signaling game, not just serve to influence but serve to constitute institutional 
activity. He makes the key argument that ‘texts’ such as reports, contracts, memos or work orders can be  
said to be performing action that have outcomes in the sense of producing effects upon the actions of 
other actors. In short, ‘texts’ on their own appear to make a difference to institutions and as such should 
be considered as having a limited form of agency. To demonstrate this, he uses a thought experiment 
which has some synergy with the one proposed in the current paper. Imagine a visual sign placed in the 
reception area of an organization building. This sign acts in the sense of directing people to do certain 
things such as swiping their entry pass at the entry gate or visiting reception to authorize their entry. As 
such, the sign stands in place of particular actions typically undertaken by security personnel responsible 
for controlling organizational entry. The sign acts to instruct people without the need for security 
personnel to re-iterate the same thing time and again in acts of verbal communication. In a similar 
manner, the magnetic token of our signaling game serves to stand in place of the assertions and directions 
of particular human actors in multiple situations where such actors may not be co-present. 
Information, at least in terms of its evolutionary course is particularly associated with the idea of 
embodiment (Varela, Thompson et al 1993) – the notion that actors have bodies and both experience and 
change the world through such embodiment. This means that it is difficult to discuss information without 
some notion of the sensory and effector apparatus of particular actors. As we have seen, the sensory 
apparatus of a particular actor denotes the various organs that can be used to sense the external 
environment. The effector apparatus of a particular actor refers to the various parts of the body that can 
be used to manipulate or effect the external environment. Both the sensory and effector apparatus of 
specific actors is related to the notion of a sensory modality. To communicate, one actor must be able to 
manipulate some aspect of the environment with its effector apparatus; other actors must be able to sense 
the signal along the sensory modality effected. Various sensory modalities adopted by different species 
include vision, audition, olfaction and electroreception. 
 Signaling games 
  
 Thirty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin 2016 15 
But information, if it is to be associated with the conventions of the human sphere, must rely upon shared 
intentionality – a collective background of ‘aboutness’ must exist between observations (sensations), 
messages (communicative actions) and mutual performance amongst a community of actors. As argued 
above we do not need to think of information as being transferred between two actors. But we do need 
some explanatory account of how multiple actors within their internal environment can share goals and 
action plans. Searle (1983) refers to this ability as collective intentionality and believes it is a capability 
not only present in humans but also in our closest evolutionary relatives. Tomasello and Carpenter 
disagree and limit the ability to construct shared intentionality to our own species. 
Information is necessarily reliant upon materiality, intentionality, agency and embodiment. Information 
is objective, subjective, inter-subjective and even a null concept if we try to support the notion of 
information as the physical transfer of intentions from one actor to another. The tentative conclusion we 
draw from turning these ‘knobs’ on our intuition pump is that in essence, information must be an 
entangled phenomenon. In other words, all four conceptions of information have an inherent truth but 
only within the context of some signaling game. This means that as an initial proposition it might be best 
to consider information not as a distinct but as an emergent phenomenon. It emerges from some system 
of signaling – the complex signaling games that both animals and humans ‘play’. As such, the thought 
experiment of a signaling game offers a way of understanding how specific patterns of communication 
arise amongst a community of actors and how such patterns adapt to the action – environment important 
to such actors. The whole point in using the signalling game as a thought experiment to unpack the nature 
of information was to demonstrate that the sign ‘information’ is used currently in at least four different 
ways to denote particular facets of the signalling game itself. My strategy is one of moving the denotation 
of this sign from the facets of the game individually to the entire system of action that it comprises. This is 
what I mean by saying that information emerges from such a system of action. 
Applying the lens of a signaling game to unpacking particular ways of organizing also offers insight into 
the proper nature of an information system. A close analysis of thought experiments such as the ones 
considered in the current paper suggests that the concept of an information system, whether present in 
situations of animal or human behavior, is best assigned not to the category of substantive systems but to 
the category of an emergent system. Ryle started an approach to the concept of mind which regards it as 
an emergent system reliant upon a number of physical systems, most importantly the central nervous 
system. Likewise, an information system can be observed to emerge from the entangled inter-action of 
articulation, communication and coordination, all working together. The term information system 
properly stands for certain properties that emerge from what we have referred to in previous work as the 
continuous enactment of significance (Beynon-Davies 2011). Such properties emerge from the inter-
action between the articulation of material artefacts, the communication of intent that such entails and 
the coordination of the work of multiple actors that results from such articulation and communication. 
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